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ARGUMENT 
POINT. UTAH DOES NOT HAVE JURISDICTION TO PROSECUTE 
THE CHARGE OF CRIMINAL NON-SUPPORT SINCE THE FAILURE 
TO SUPPORT OCCURRED IN ALASKA. 
The crime of criminal non-support is not committed wholly or partly in the state of 
Utah when the children reside in another state and the duty to perform exists in that state. 
See Appellant's opening brief at 5-14. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201 (1 )(a) (1999) 
indicates that Utah has jurisdiction when "the offense is committed either wholly or 
partly within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(2) instructs that "[a]n offense is 
committed partly within this state if either the conduct which is any element of the 
offense, or the result which is such an element, occurs within this state." In this case, the 
result did not occur in this state, so the second part of section 76-1-201 does not apply. 
Additionally, the first part of subsection (2) does not create jurisdiction for Utah because 
the conduct which is the element of the offense, failure to provide, occurred in Alaska. 
The State incorrectly claims that a crime occurs in Utah if any element occurs in 
this state. State's brief at 7. The "partly" rule of subsection (2) applies, however, only if 
the conduct which is an element of the crime occurs in Utah. By including the word 
"conduct" the Legislature explicitly required that the conduct occur in this state and that 
having the mental state alone while in this state is not enough to create jurisdiction in 
Utah. Had the Legislature intended that any element, including mental state, must occur 
in this State in order for a crime to be committed partly in this state, it would have simply 
said that rather than including the term "conduct" in subsection (2). The State's claim 
that this alleged crime occurred in Utah because the defendant is here and had the 
requisite mental state is therefore incorrect because the mental state element does not 
involve conduct. 
Additionally, the State is incorrect that the crime occurred partly in this state 
because the failure to provide support occurred here. As set forth in Appellant's opening 
brief at 5-13, the failure to provide support occurred where the children were located. 
While the conduct for any crime of omission occurs where the duty to perform lies, the 
crime of criminal non-support demonstrates the practicality of this rule. In a criminal 
non-support case, the duty to provide follows the children and the state where the 
children reside, not the state where the parent may be at any particular time, has the 
interest in prosecuting the case. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.4(1) (Supp. 1996) recognizes this concept. It states, 
"[obligations ordered for child support and medical expenses are for the use and benefit 
of the child and shall follow the child." This section, and by implication, subsection (4) 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(4), support the notion that failure to provide support, a 
crime of omission, occurs at the place where the support is owed. 
A number of cases in addition to those listed in Appellant's opening brief 
recognize this concept that the failure to provide support is committed where the children 
reside. See e ^ People v. Hennefent, 42 N.E.2d 633 (111. App. Ct. 1942) (court did not 
have jurisdiction over prosecution for failure to support where child and mother resided 
in a different county); In re Bryant, 271 P. 926 (Cal Dist. Ct. App. 1928) Gurisdiction 
over offense of failure to provide support for children is in county where children and 
mother reside); Adams v. State, 159 N.W. 726, 727 (Wis. 1916) ("place where the 
children were, not where the father was during the period complained of, fixes the venue 
of a prosecution for non-support of children"); State v. Dvoracek, 118 N.W. 399, 401 
(Iowa 1908) ("venue depends on where the omission to perform the duty occurred"). 
The court in Dvoracek pointed out that the conduct required for failure to provide 
support is an omission which occurs where the children reside. 118 N.W. at 401. It 
stated, "The statute under consideration, save the portion in relation to abandonment, is 
essentially negative. The penalty is denounced, not on the commission of any affirmative 
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act, but on the omission of the plainest duty. Necessarily, then, the venue depends on 
where the omission to perform the duty occurred." L±„ 
The State is correct that some courts have held that the state in which the parent 
lives has jurisdiction to prosecute for criminal non-support. See State's brief at 12-13 
and cases cited therein. These decisions are based, however, on the language of the 
criminal and jurisdictional statutes as well as the legislative intent as evidenced by other 
statutes in those states. See e ^ In re Alexander. 36 A.2d 361, 362 (Del. Super. Ct. 
1944) (court looks to "exact language of the statute and the policy of the State as 
indicated by the legislative Acts" in determining whether Delaware had jurisdiction to 
prosecute father for non-support); Government of the Virgin Islands v. Audain , 366 F. 
Supp. 710, 713 (D. Virgin Is. 1973) (court examines statutory scheme of Virgin Islands); 
State v. James. 100 A.2d 12, 16 (Md. 1953) (statute explicitly provided for jurisdiction 
over father even if children did not reside in state, stating, "[a] person charged with a 
violation of this section may be prosecuted in the jurisdiction where he or the wife or the 
child resides"); State v. Jackson. 112 S.E.2d 452, 455, 457 (W. Va. 1960) (emphasis 
deleted) (statute explicitly stated that offense of failure to provide was "committed in any 
county in which such husband, parent, wife, child or children may be "). Because 
Utah's statutory scheme does not contain explicit language stating that Utah has 
jurisdiction under these circumstances and instead indicates a legislative intent that the 
obligation to support follows the child and that the conduct for a crime of omission 
4 
occurs where the duty to perform lies, these decisions interpreting different statutory 
schemes are not persuasive. 
Additionally, in some of the cases cited by the State in support of its position, the 
child was in the same state as the father or otherwise had a significant connection with 
the charging state when charges were filed. See. Alexander. 36 A.2d at 362 (wife and 
child were in Delaware when proceedings were begun and later left for Pennsylvania); 
State v. Borum. 178 So. 371, 373 (La. 1937) (the family's domicile was Louisiana up 
until the time the father abandoned them); State v. Rosenstock. 1995 WL 723535 (Ohio 
App. 10 Dist.) (unpublished) (court concluded Ohio had jurisdiction under its statutory 
scheme in case where wife and child had apparently resided in Ohio for seventeen years 
before leaving for Maryland). In fact, the court recognized in Borum that if the family 
had not previously been domiciled in Louisiana, Louisiana might not have had 
jurisdiction to prosecute the father for desertion and non-support. 
Defendant contends that his wrongful act is not such as to make him 
amenable to the laws of this state, because his minor children were residing 
outside the state at the time he is charged with their nonsupport. 
If the domicile of defendant and his family had always been in Mississippi, 
and if his first wife and children had never acquired a domicile in 
Louisiana and defendant was only temporarily in this state, there might be 
some merit in his contention. But that is not the case. 
Id. at 373. By contrast, in the present case, Appellant's wife and children have never 
been domiciled in Utah and have never even visited Utah. 
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The State also takes issue with the proposition set forth in Poole v. State. 208 
N.W. 2d 328, 331 (Wis. 1973) that the "crime of nonsupport is a continuing offense that 
follows the children" and the place where the children reside is the location where the 
crime is committed. See State's brief at 15. The State suggests that the Wisconsin court 
of appeals decision in State v. Gantt. 548 N.W.2d 134, 136 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996) 
undermines the Wisconsin Supreme Court decision in Poole. State's brief at 15. Aside 
from the obvious response that a lower court cannot overrule the supreme court's holding 
that the crime of non-support follows the children, a review of Gantt clarifies that Gantt 
discussed an entirely different jurisdictional question than the one before the Court in 
Poole or this case. 
In Gantt. neither the father nor his former wife and children lived in Wisconsin 
during the period in which it was alleged that Gantt failed to provide support. Gantt, 548 
N.W. at 136. The court concluded it had jurisdiction despite the fact that none of the 
interested parties resided in the state because the prosecution was "based on Gantt's 
willful failure to comply with a valid Wisconsin judgment requiring him to pay child 
support to the clerk of the Dane County Circuit Court." IcL. at 211. In other words, the 
prosecution was not based on a general failure to provide support, as was the case in 
Poole as well as the present case. Instead, the Gantt court emphasized that the 
prosecution was based on failure to pay ordered support and Wisconsin therefore had 
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jurisdiction to enforce the order that was entered by Wisconsin courts. This distinction 
was critical to the court's holding: 
In both Adams [v. State, 159 N.W. 726, 727 (Wis. 1916)] and Poole the 
prosecutions were based not on the violation of a court order but rather on 
the general statutory obligation to provide support for minor children, 
[footnote omitted]. As a result, the obligations underlying those 
prosecutions derived not from an accomplished judicial act, as in this case, 
but on allegations that general laws governing parental responsibility had 
been violated. And those obligations ran directly to the children --at the 
place where they and their custodial parents resided - - without any court 
or government involvement 
Adams and Poole are thus consistent with the general criminal-law rule that 
a crime involving a failure to act is committed at the place where the act is 
required to be performed . . . . 
Id. at 210-211 (emphasis added). Because Gantt involved a consideration of whether 
Wisconsin had jurisdiction to prosecute a failure to comply with a Wisconsin support 
order, it did not undermine Poole and has no bearing on the issue before the court in this 
case. 
Utah's statutory scheme demonstrates a legislative intent that the conduct 
associated with an omission to perform a duty is committed at the location where the duty 
is owed. Utah's statutory scheme likewise demonstrates that the Legislature intended 
that the obligation to support children follows the children. Utah therefore does not have 
jurisdiction to prosecute Johnson for criminal non-support in this case where the children 
have not been to this state and reside in Alaska. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant/Appellant Richard Johnson respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the Order of the lower court and order that the case be dismissed. 
DATED this zl**- day of September, 2002. 
JOANGWATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
STEPHEN W. HOWARD 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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